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On the Ethical Dimension of Heraclitus’ Thought* 
Mark A. Johnstone 
 
Heraclitus is more often read as a natural philosopher or metaphysician than as an ethical 
thinker. However, few today would deny he was also interested in the human condition, 
and in questions about how we should live. Still, scholars differ in how central they think 
ethical concerns were for Heraclitus, and over how these concerns to relate to other 
aspects of his thought.1 Furthermore, the ethical dimension of Heraclitus’ thought has 
seldom been the object of focused study.2 My purpose in this paper is to examine the 
ethical dimension of Heraclitus’ thought in detail, and to explore its connections to his 
other views. When I speak of Heraclitus’ “ethical thought,” I use this label broadly. I 
believe Heraclitus was deeply interested in the question of how we should live. 
Furthermore, I believe his views on this question were integral to, and integrated with, his 
broader philosophical outlook. This is the aspect of his thought I wish to explore.3 
 
* I am grateful to Gabor Betegh, Daniel Graham, Rich Neels and David Wolfsdorf for their helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper.  
1 Many scholars marginalize the ethical dimension of Heraclitus’ thought. For example, G. S. Kirk, 
Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments [Cosmic Fragments] (Cambridge, 1954), reads Heraclitus primarily 
as an empirically minded natural philosopher. For reasons that will become clear, I disagree with Kirk’s 
claim, in his preface, that the extant fragments “fall not unnaturally” into two distinct classes: the “cosmic 
fragments,” which deal with the world as a whole, the logos, fire and the opposites, and the 
“anthropomorphic fragments,” which deal with the soul, epistemology, ethics and politics. M. Marcovich, 
Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary [Heraclitus] (Sankt Augustin, 1967) includes a brief 
section on Heraclitus’ ethics at the end of his book. However, he reads Heraclitus as a straightforward 
advocate for the martial and elitist ethical values typical of aristocrats in his day, and finds little of 
philosophical interest. By contrast, others, such as Kahn, Art and Thought and R. Dilcher, Studies in 
Heraclitus [Studies] (Hildesheim, 1995), have read Heraclitus as centrally interested in the human 
condition. However, neither Kahn nor Dilcher connects Heraclitus’ ethical thought to his psychology, 
epistemology, natural philosophy and theology in quite the way I do here.  
2 A notable recent exception is D. Sider, “Heraclitus’ Ethics,” in Doctrine and Doxography: Studies on 
Heraclitus and Pythagoras, D. Sider and D. Obbink (eds.) (Berlin, 2013), 321-34. However, Sider 
construes the label “Heraclitus’ ethics” more narrowly than I do here. As Sider observes, “investigations 
into Heraclitus’ ethics are scarce on the ground” (1). 
A recent piece by Kurt Raaflaub, on the political aspect of Heraclitus’ thought, appeared too late 
for me to incorporate its main ideas into the body of this paper (K. Raaflaub, “Shared Responsibility for 
the Common Good: Heraclitus, Early Philosophy and Political Thought,” in R. McKirahan et al. (eds.), 
Heraklit im Kontext (De Gruyter, 2017), 103-27). Suffice it to note that Raaflaub’s efforts to locate 
Heraclitus within the context of the development of Greek political thought more broadly prove quite 
productive, and generate interesting new insights into several fragments. Raaflaub follows a very 
different thread through Heraclitus than I do, and most of his ideas seem compatible with my main claims 
here; although, as will become clear in what follows, I am inclined to read Heraclitus’s prominent  
“common”/“private” distinction more in epistemological terms.  
3 My claim is that Heraclitus was deeply and centrally interested in questions about how we should live, 
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In keeping with this goal, I begin (§1) with Heraclitus’ views on the psuchê, or 
“soul.” As is now widely recognized, Heraclitus was an important innovator in the history 
of early Greek thinking about the soul. Here, I highlight ways in which his ideas on this 
theme are most significant for the history of Greek ethics. Next (§2), I turn to his closely 
related views on human understanding, and explore their connections to his ethical 
concerns. Specifically, I argue, Heraclitus believed an adequate comprehension of the 
world, and of our place within it, is necessary for a living a good human life.4 I also ask 
why, according to him, most people lack this understanding. Finally (§3), I argue that 
Heraclitus’ views on the relationship between god and man – and his contrasts between 
human and divine – undergird his ideas about the importance of wisdom for living well. 
 
1. The Soul 
 
Heraclitus was an innovator when it comes to the psuchê, a term I translate here, 
following tradition, as “soul.” The nature of his innovations, and their importance for his 
ethical thought, can best be appreciated against the backdrop of earlier views. Much has 
been written about the use of the term “psuchê” in Homer, and about its shifting meaning 
in the centuries that followed.5 Speaking generally, and with some risk of 
oversimplification, the term “psuchê” had a narrower and more specific meaning in 
earlier texts, then gradually expanded its semantic range during the sixth and fifth 
centuries, in both philosophical and non-philosophical writings.6 In Homer, as has been 
 
and concerning what makes a human life go badly or well. I take these to be ethical questions, broadly 
construed. My aim in this paper will be explicate and explore his answers to these questions. I doubt 
Heraclitus ever systematically addressed questions about the nature and extent of our obligations to 
others, of the kind central to much contemporary normative ethics. At least, I find insufficient evidence in 
the extent fragments and testimonia to justify attributing specific views on such matters to him. But what 
we do find in Heraclitus, I shall urge, are views about wellbeing and an ethics of human excellence in 
which wisdom, tempered by discipline and self-control, plays a leading role. See also next note. 
4 My claim will be that Heraclitus regarded such comprehension as necessary for living well, and as 
something most people lack – not that he deemed it alone sufficient for wellbeing. 
5 For detailed discussion of this development, with supporting examples, see D. Claus, Toward the Soul: An 
Inquiry into the Meaning of the Word Psuchê Before Plato [Toward the Soul] (New Haven and London, 
1981). For a summary and overview of changes in the use of the word “psuchê,” see H. Lorenz, “Ancient 
Theories of Soul,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009 revision).  
6 The idea that “psuchê” gradually expanded its meaning over time has now largely displaced the older 
view, influentially articulated by J. Burnet, “The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul”, Proceedings of the 
British Academy, 7 (1916), 235–59, that Socrates’ invocation to his fellow Athenians to “care for their 
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widely observed, it denoted either (i) that without which a person is dead, a “life force,” 
which warriors risk in battle, or (ii) that which leaves a person at death to continue its 
existence as a “shade” in Hades. In addition, the word was used only when death is in 
some way salient.7 To have a psuchê was to be alive. However, although the soul was 
viewed as responsible for life, its role in life was felt to be limited: it was not the “core” 
of the living human being, the basis of personality, or the source of our various 
psychological attributes. In particular, it was not regarded as responsible for our desires 
or feelings, was not held to serve as the center of cognition or bodily coordination, and 
was not treated as the bearer of ethical value.8  
In contrast to the limited and specific early use of “psuchê,” Heraclitus assigned 
the soul significant new roles.9 In particular, he was the first thinker we know of to treat 
the soul of the living person as the centre of cognition and the bearer of ethical value. In 
treating the soul in these ways, Heraclitus anticipated the ideas of later philosophers, for 
whom the psuchê played a central role in psychology, epistemology and ethics. I begin 
with the following Heraclitean fragments, which all assign new significance to the soul:10 
 
B107: Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to people if they have barbarian souls. 
B117: A man when drunk is led by a boy, stumbling and not knowing where he goes, 
having his soul moist. 
B118: Gleam of light: the dry soul, wisest and best. 
 
In these fragments, Heraclitus treats the soul of a living person as something that can be 
 
souls” marked an abrupt and radical break from the still dominant Homeric usage of the word. 
7 This feature of Homeric use was emphasized by B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, [Discovery] T. G. 
Rosenmeyer (trans.) (Oxford, 1953) (originally published Die Entdeckung des Geistes, Hamburg, 1946).  
8 Here and in what follows, when I refer to the soul as the “bearer of ethical value,” I mean that its good or 
bad state during life determines, at least to a large degree, whether a human being lives well or badly, and 
hence that the soul’s state should be an object of ethical concern.  
9 The novelty of Heraclitus’ use of the term ‘psuchê’ has long been recognized. See especially M. 
Nussbaum “‘Psuchê’ in Heraclitus,” [“Psuchê”] Phronesis 17.1 (1972), 1-16, 153-70, and M. Schofield, 
“Heraclitus’ Theory of the Soul and its Antecedents,” [“Theory”] in S. Everson (ed.), Companions to 
Ancient Thought 2: Psychology (Cambridge, 1991), 13-34. Nussbaum and Schofield both argue 
Heraclitus not only deviated from the Homeric conception of psuchê, but also deliberately challenged it. 
10 I refer to all fragments using the numbers of Diels-Kranz. Translations are those of R. McKirahan, 
Philosophy Before Socrates, 2nd Ed. (Indianapolis, 2010), sometimes slightly modified.  
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in better or worse states. Furthermore, in all three fragments, the soul’s condition is 
linked to the state of a person’s cognitive powers. First, in B107, some human souls are 
said to be “barbarous,” an adjective that usually denoted those unable to speak Greek. 
Some have argued that the word had this specific meaning here too. On this view, 
Heraclitus argued that our senses mislead us if we don’t know “how to hear or speak” (cf. 
B19) our own language.11 Others, however, have interpreted Heraclitus as using the term 
metaphorically, to claim that a person whose soul is barbaros is as uncomprehending of 
what his senses “tell” him as barbaroi are of the Greek language.12 For present purposes, 
the important point holds on either interpretation: Heraclitus was not rejecting the senses 
outright, but rather claiming they are “good witnesses” only when their evidence is 
rightly interpreted and understood. Furthermore, crucially, on both interpretations 
Heraclitus traces our inability to understand what the senses tell us specifically to a defect 
in our souls. For him, it seems, understanding the world through our senses requires that 
our soul – treated as the locus of this cognitive power – be in the right state. 
Fragment 117 reinforces the thought that the soul is the seat of cognition, and also 
the idea that it can be in better or worse states. The condition of the drunk is humiliating: 
he is reduced to the point where he is inferior to, and dependent on, an immature child, 
who must lead him along. Heraclitus traces the source of the drunk’s cognitive 
impairment – which leaves him stumbling, unaware of where he goes – specifically to the 
condition of his soul, which is moistened by the drink he has consumed. This idea would 
probably have startled Heraclitus’ audience, unaccustomed as they were to regarding the 
soul as the centre of cognition and physical coordination. Taken as a whole, the image is 
playful, but also clearly had a serious point. Heraclitus’ disdain for the drunk is palpable: 
a grown man should be superior to and leading a child, not vice versa.13 Implicitly, 
Heraclitus urges us to remain self-possessed and clear-headed, and not to allow our souls 
to enter such a state. This message echoes that of other fragments, in which Heraclitus 
 
11 E.g. Nussbaum, “Psuchê,” 7-15, and also K. Robb, “Psyche and Logos in the Fragments of Heraclitus: 
The Origins of the Concept of Soul,” The Monist 69.3 (1986), 315-51, at 327-33. 
12 E.g. Snell, Discovery, 145; Kirk, Cosmic Fragments, 281, 376; Marcovich, Heraclitus, 47-8, Kahn, Art 
and Thought 106-7. Incidentally, this second interpretation does not require anachronistically attributing 
to Heraclitus anything as specific as the modern notion of “sense data,” as critics have claimed. 
13 Heraclitus also appeals to the superiority of adults to children in B79, B121. 
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extolls sound thinking and self-control (sôphronein).14 It also chimes with fragments in 
which Heraclitus associates physical pleasure with moistening of the soul, and in which 
he denigrates bodily gratification.15 
In B107 and B117, Heraclitus considers souls that are in bad shape; by contrast, in 
B118, we learn about the state of the best soul. In sharp contrast to the moistened, 
impaired soul of the drunk, it is a “dry” soul, Heraclitus claims, that is “wisest and best” 
(sophôtatê kai aristê). Here, the soul in its best state is characterized as an augê:16 
usually, a beam of light, like a sunbeam. Heraclitus may have chosen this image to 
emphasize clarity of thought in the good soul. In any case, he again connects the good 
condition of the soul to the good state of the agent’s cognitive powers. Indeed, by placing 
the superlative adjectives in parallel, Heraclitus effectively identifies the best soul with 
the wisest. In this way, this fragment tells us both about the physical state of the best soul 
(it is dry), and also about its corresponding cognitive state (it is wise). 
I shall return to Heraclitus’ views on the nature and importance of wisdom shortly. 
First, though, it will be useful to briefly consider the soul’s physical constitution, in 
relation to its good state. For Heraclitus, the psuchê was not immaterial, as the translation 
“soul” might misleadingly suggest to some modern readers. Rather, he envisaged it as 
 
14 In B112 and B116, Heraclitus strongly praises sôphronein (“thinking soundly”). This term connoted not 
only sound thinking, but also self-possession, self-awareness and self-control. It was, therefore, the 
antithesis of what the drunk displays. Some (e.g. Marcovich, Kirk) have doubted the authenticity of these 
two fragments; others (e.g. Kahn) have defended them. Yet even if we grant that Stobaeus may have 
“flattened out” the aphorisms he reported, he is generally a respectable source, while the Ionic forms give 
some confidence. On the whole, it is reasonable to think the praise of sôphronein is genuinely 
Heraclitean. Further evidence that Heraclitus favoured self-control may be found in B110 (“it is not better 
for people to get all they want”) and in B85 (“it is difficult to fight passion (thumos), for whatever it 
wants it buys at the price of soul”). R. Bolton, “Nature and Human Good in Heraclitus,” in K. Boudouris 
(ed.), Ionian Philosophy (Athens, 1989), 49-57, argues that Heraclitus’ praise of sôphronein (which he 
translates as “moderation”) lay at the heart of his ethics, since to be moderate is to make oneself orderly, 
and hence to resemble the orderly natural world. This idea is appealing, but speculative. At any rate, I 
believe Heraclitus placed more emphasis on understanding the cosmos than on imitating it.  
15 B77: “For souls it is pleasure, not death, to become moist.” As J. Mansfeld, “Heraclitus on the 
Psychology and Physiology of Sleep and on Rivers,” Mnemosyne 20 (1967), 1-29, has argued, there is no 
need to amend the received text, contra Diels and others. Getting drunk both brings pleasure (terpsis, 
“sensual delight”) and moistens the soul – but it does not destroy it. It may be “death” for souls to become 
water (B36), but Heraclitus clearly thought a soul could become progressively moister (or drier) without 
ceasing to be soul. Heraclitus implicitly denigrates bodily gratification in B29, when he says the many 
“stuff themselves like cattle.”  
16 Reading augê, with Diels-Kranz. For arguments for this construal of the text, which is questioned by 
Marcovich, see J. Bollack and H. Wismann, Héraclite ou la separation (Paris, 1972), 325-7. 
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composed of some kind of material stuff. Scholars have disagreed about what kind of 
stuff this is: some have argued for fire, some for air, some for an alternative to both.17 For 
present purposes, there is no need to adjudicate between these possibilities. Still, we 
might wonder how the material composition of the soul relates to its role as bearer of 
ethical value and seat of our cognitive powers.18 As far as we know, Heraclitus took no 
interest in, say, the physiology of cognition. Nevertheless, he clearly believed there is at 
least a correlation between the physical state of one’s soul and one’s psychological and 
ethical condition. Furthermore, he seems to have envisaged causation running in both 
directions: physical changes to the soul can cause psychological effects, as in the case of 
the drunk of B117 (cf. B77), while our mental states can alter the soul’s physical 
condition. For example, passion (thumos) can diminish the soul (B85), while attaining 
understanding transforms it into a dry gleam, the soul that is “wisest and best.”  
Some scholars have located an important connection between Heraclitus’ 
conception of the soul and his ethics in his theory of the afterlife. On this view, Heraclitus 
took our soul’s posthumous fate to reflect our ethical conduct. For example, some claim 
that the best Heraclitean soul is rewarded upon death with ascent to the aether, where it 
joins the surrounding cosmic fire.19 However, the extant fragments do not support 
attributing this view to Heraclitus. His claims that “greater deaths win greater destinies” 
 
17 The view that Heraclitean soul is fire is widely held. See e.g. Marcovich, Heraclitus, 361, 377; G. S Kirk, 
J. E Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (2nd Ed.) (Cambridge, 1983), 203-10; 
Schofield “Theory,” 20; D. Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and 
Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, Part I (Cambridge, 2010), 192. For arguments that it is 
air, see Kahn, Art and Thought, 238-40, followed by T. Robinson, Heraclitus: Fragments – A Text with 
Translation and Commentary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 104-5. G. Betegh, “On the 
Physical Aspect of Heraclitus’ Psychology” [“Physical Aspect”], Phronesis 52 (2007), 3–32, surveys the 
evidence and concludes that Heraclitean soul was probably neither fire nor air, but rather “exhalation” 
(anathumiasis) – that is, roughly, vapour which arises from water in the presence of heat, and which can 
exhibit a range of states from heavy mist to dry air. This interpretation has strong support in ancient 
testimony, including the Stoics and Aristotle (DA 1.2 405a24). Moreover, as Betegh emphasizes, it readily 
accommodates Heraclitus’ idea that the soul can become progressively moister or drier while remaining 
in existence. This feature of Heraclitus’ view is crucial for his ethics, but is difficult to square with the 
idea that soul is fire, since it is hard to make sense of the idea of moist fire.  
18 It is perhaps worth noting that the idea of a physical stuff bearing mental functions was probably not 
considered especially strange at this time. In support of this thought, see Betegh, “Physical Aspect,” who 
argues that Heraclitus shared with other early thinkers, such as Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaxagoras, 
the general metaphysical assumption that “that which is the bearer of mental functions in us is a stuff that 
occurs also elsewhere in the world in smaller and larger quantities” (233). 
19 See especially G. S. Kirk, “Heraclitus and Death in Battle (fr.24 D),” American Journal of Philology 70 
(1949), 384-93, followed by Kirk, Raven and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 207-8.  
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(B25) and that “gods and humans honour those slain in war” (B24) could refer to 
posthumous reputation as easily as to a literal afterlife (cf. B29: “the best renounce all 
things for one thing, the eternal fame of mortals …”). Fragment B27 (“things unexpected 
and unthought of await humans when they die”) hardly justifies ascribing any positive 
eschatological doctrine. The meaning of B98 (“souls sniff in Hades”) is obscure, but its 
point may have been epistemological or even satirically anti-Homeric; at any rate, it is 
unlikely Heraclitus intended to endorse a traditional view of souls persisting as “shades” 
in Hades. In fact, none of the extant fragments clearly supports attributing a belief in an 
afterlife to Heraclitus at all, and some scholars have doubted he held any such belief.20 
Yet even if he did believe in an afterlife for the soul, our textual evidence provides no 
sound basis for attributing a specific, positive, eschatological doctrine to him. In any 
case, as far as his ethical views are concerned, it seems his focus lay more on the state of 
the soul in this life than on its fate in the next. 
For present purposes, I have said enough about Heraclitus’ conception of the soul. To 
recap, Heraclitus was an innovator when it comes to the psuchê and its role. His most 
significant innovation – and the most important for this paper – is that he granted the soul 
of the living person new significance as the centre of cognition and bearer of ethical 
value. The soul can be placed in better or worse states by the actions we perform, the 
emotions we feel, and the choices we make. Furthermore, for Heraclitus, this clearly 
matters: we should care about the good condition of our soul. In its best state, the soul is 
both “dry” and “wise.” Achieving this state requires, it seems, discipline and self-control. 
In addition, it also requires acquiring insight and comprehension. Indeed, as we will see, 
Heraclitus has a great deal to say about the importance of understanding in a good human 
life. If this is right, Heraclitus anticipated two of the central strands in Socratic (and post-
Socratic) ancient Greek ethical thought. First, he claimed people should care about the 
state of their souls. Second, he considered wisdom essential for living well.  
 
2. Human Understanding 
 
 
20 Nussbaum, “Psuchê,” 153-69; J. Manseld, “Heraclitus on Soul and Super-Soul, with an Afterthought on 
the Afterlife,” Rhizomata 3(1) 2015, 62-93.  
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On even a cursory reading of the extant fragments, it is clear that human understanding – 
and its lack – was among Heraclitus’ central concerns. Time and again, he denounces the 
masses, and various figures with a popular reputation for wisdom, for their 
incomprehension. At the same time, the fragments are replete with epistemological 
vocabulary.21 By focusing on human understanding, rather than merely stating how things 
are, Heraclitus became a more self-conscious and (we might say) philosophical thinker 
than many of his predecessors. In addition, I believe his views on insight (noos) and 
wisdom (sophia) lie at the heart of his ethical outlook. I will argue that Heraclitus is not 
best understood as dogmatically asserting positive doctrines, then arrogantly berating 
others for failing to understand what he said, as is often supposed. Rather, I maintain, his 
emphasis on the incomprehension of others reflects his fundamental stance on the human 
condition. In particular, Heraclitus believed most people are oblivious to, and at odds 
with, the world in which they live – and, crucially, live badly as a result. If this is right, 
then understanding his views on the nature and causes of human incomprehension is 
essential for appreciating his stance on how humans should live, and why. 
One of Heraclitus’ central ideas – and a recurring motif in the extant fragments – 
is that most people are not fully present in, or aware of, their own world. Despite 
appearing to be awake, they are like sleepwalkers; despite appearing to listen, they are 
like the deaf; and, in general, despite appearing to be present, they are “absent.”22 When 
Heraclitus made such remarks, it was clearly no ordinary kind of ignorance he had in 
mind. His point was not that most people are unable to understand his (or anyone else’s) 
scientific or metaphysical theories, or that there are gaps in their knowledge of particular 
facts. Rather, Heraclitus was claiming that most people are oblivious in some 
fundamental way to the very nature of the world in which they live – and even, as he 
says, to what they do and say. Furthermore, crucially, they are unaware of their own sorry 
state.23 But what is it that ordinary people are ignorant of, and oblivious to, according to 
 
21 For discussion of Heraclitus’ epistemological vocabulary, focusing especially on noos, gnôsis, sunesis 
and their derivatives, see J. Lesher, “Heraclitus’ Epistemological Vocabulary [“Vocabulary”]” Hermes 111 
(1983), 155–70. 
22 Ordinary people are compared to sleepers in B1 (quoted below) (cf. B73 and B89), and to the deaf in 
B34: “Uncomprehending when they have heard, they are like the deaf. The saying describes them: though 
present they are absent.”  
23 Cf. B17: “For the many, in fact all that come upon them, do not understand such things, nor when they 
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Heraclitus? This much seems clear: on his view, what they fail to grasp can be referred to 
as “the logos.” The following fragments shed light on this idea: 
 
B1: Although this logos holds always humans prove unable to understand it, both before 
hearing and when they have first heard.24 For although all things come to be in 
accordance with this logos, people are like the inexperienced when they experience such 
words and deeds as I set out, distinguishing each thing in accordance with its nature and 
saying how it is. But other people fail to notice what they do when awake, just as they fail 
to notice what they do while asleep. 
B89: For the waking there is one common world, but when asleep each person turns away 
to a private one. 
B114 (first part): Those who speak with insight must rely on what is common to all, as a 
city must rely on law, and much more firmly. 
B2: For this reason it is necessary to follow what is common. But although the logos is 
common, most people behave as if they had their own private understanding. 
B50: Listening not to me but to the logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one.  
 
Although much is unclear in these fragments, it seems safe to say the following. First, 
despite the arguments of a small minority of scholars, what most people fail to 
understand, for Heraclitus, cannot simply be his own account.25 This is not only because 
he accuses people of failing to comprehend the logos before they have even heard what 
he has to say (B1). Nor is it simply because he weightily distinguishes between listening 
to him and listening to “the logos” (B50). Rather, it is above all because the logos is said 
to be “common” (xunon) (B2). It might be argued that when Heraclitus says “the logos is 
common,” he means simply “my account is true.” However, the recurrence of “xunon” in 
other fragments, where it is consistently contrasted with “the private” (e.g. B89, B114, 
 
have noticed them do they know them, but they seem to themselves <to do so>,” and B56 (first part): 
“People are deceived about the knowledge of obvious things.”  
24 To avoid prejudging important interpretive questions, I leave the term “logos” untranslated. I explain how 
I understand its meaning below.  
25 The view that “logos” in B1, B2 and B50 refers simply to Heraclitus’ own account is defended by M. 
West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford, 1971), 124-9, and by J. Barnes, The Presocratic 
Philosophers (London, 1982), 59. 
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quoted above), shows it means not “true,” but rather something like “public,” “shared,” 
“available to all.” If this is right, what Heraclitus claimed most people fail to understand 
is something shared and available to them all. It is not Heraclitus’ own, particular logos, 
then, but rather the one, common, cosmic logos.26 
How should we make sense of this idea of a cosmic logos, which is available to 
all, yet which people constantly fail to understand? I have argued elsewhere that it is 
possible to do this without anachronistically taking the word “logos” to denote something 
like a fixed “formula” or “law” underlying change in the cosmos.27 Rather, I submit, 
Heraclitus chose the word “logos” because he took understanding the world as a whole to 
be relevantly like understanding a written or spoken “account” (the usual meaning of 
“logos” in his day). Specifically, on this view, much as one must go beyond the meanings 
of individual words (epea) to understand the meaning of a connected account (logos), so 
one must go beyond isolated experiences to understand the meaning of the world as an 
interconnected whole.28 On this view, the word “logos” – at least as used in fragments 
B1, B2 and B50 – denotes neither Heraclitus’ own account, nor an unchanging “cosmic 
law,” but rather the world’s constant, common “account” of itself to us all.29 If this is 
right, understanding the cosmic logos is neither understanding what Heraclitus says nor 
grasping a fixed “formula” underlying change. Rather, it is comprehending the world as 
whole, based on its revelation of itself to us in our experience.30 
 
26 In addition, in B72 “the logos” is characterized as something with which people are “in continuous 
contact,” yet with which they are “at odds,” with the result that “the things they meet every day appear 
strange to them.” Marcus Aurelius may have been paraphrasing. Yet the basic idea here, if even remotely 
Heraclitean, is impossible to square with the view that the logos in question is Heraclitus’ own account. 
27 Johnstone, M., “On Logos in Heraclitus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 47 (Winter 2014), 1-29.  
28 Here, I agree with Lesher, “Vocabulary,” 167-8, who argues Heraclitus’ most original epistemological 
idea was that, in general, comprehension (sunesis) of a whole requires grasping the relations among its 
elements. Just as understanding the meaning of a spoken logos requires more than hearing individual 
words, so grasping the meaning of the cosmic logos (Lesher’s phrase) requires more than familiarity with 
the elements perception provides. 
29 Cf. D. Graham, who writes that for Heraclitus “what is needed is not simply more sense experience or 
more information, but an improved way of comprehending the message (logos) that the world offers” 
(‘Heraclitus,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.) URL 
= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/heraclitus/). 
30 A key difference between my account and those of many others is that, on my interpretation, Heraclitus’ 
use of “logos” does not show he took understanding the cosmos to be a matter of grasping a single, quasi-
mathematical “formula,” “principle” or “law,” which underlies change but is itself unchanging. This is not 
to deny that Heraclitus regarded the cosmos, and its changes, as orderly and comprehensible. Indeed, that 
he did so is clear, I think, from his (novel) use of the word “cosmos” (“arrangement”) to denote the whole 
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The question of how best to understand the meaning of the word “logos” in these 
Heraclitean fragments will surely remain controversial. Nevertheless, the key point, upon 
which I insist, is that when Heraclitus called others “uncomprehending” (axunetoi, B1) of 
the logos, he meant they fail to grasp the fundamental nature of the world in which they 
live. But what exactly are they missing, and why? And what should they do, to attain 
understanding? To answer these questions, it will be helpful to examine Heraclitus’ views 
on the value and use of the senses, and on inquiry. As noted, Heraclitus does not reject the 
senses outright. This is clear from B107 (quoted above); for in claiming that the senses 
are “bad witnesses” for those with “barbarian” souls, Heraclitus suggests they can be 
good witnesses for those whose soul is in the right state. In addition, he explicitly praises 
using the senses: “all that can be seen, heard, experienced: these are what I prefer” (B55). 
For Heraclitus, it seems, the senses give us what we need to acquire wisdom. 
Nevertheless, sense experience is not sufficient. Rather, the evidence of our senses must 
be interpreted rightly if it is to lead to understanding the world. 
Heraclitus’ attitude towards empirical inquiry was apparently similar to his 
attitude towards sense experience. Such inquiry is useful, and perhaps even necessary, for 
acquiring insight and wisdom (“men who are lovers of wisdom must be inquirers into 
many things indeed” (B35)). However, it is by no means sufficient, as is clear from the 
fact that many actual “inquirers into many things” manifestly lack the kind of insight we 
should seek: 
 
B40: Much learning (polumathiê) does not teaching insight (noos). Otherwise, it would 
have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and moreover Xenophanes and Hecateaus. 
 
Much could be said about why Heraclitus criticizes these particular figures. Nevertheless, 
his general point is clear enough. Although these men inquired into many things, none of 
them acquired true insight (noos) as a result of their researches. Much learning does not 
convey insight. But how does one overcome the limitations of polymathy, interpret one’s 
evidence correctly, and comprehend things aright? Not, it seems, by relying on prominent 
 
(B30), and from his emphasis on “measure” in nature (e.g. B30, 31, 94).  
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intellectuals, traditional poets, or the popular “wisdom” of the crowd: 
 
B104: What insight (noos) or intelligence (phronêsis) have they? They put their trust in 
popular bards and take the mob for their teacher, unaware that most people are bad, and 
few are good.  
B57: Most men’s teacher is Hesiod. They are sure he knew most things – a man who 
could not recognize day and night, for they are one. 
B42: Heraclitus said that Homer ought to be expelled from the contests and flogged, and 
Archilochus likewise.  
B129: Pythagoras the son of Mnesarchus practiced inquiry (historiê) more than all other 
men, and making a selection of these writings constructed his own wisdom, polymathy, 
evil trickery.  
B28 (first part): The knowledge of the most famous persons, which they guard, is but 
opinion … 
 
We might suppose that Heraclitus’ goal in making such remarks was to reduce the 
standing of potential rivals in the eyes of his audience, and thereby to establish his 
epistemic superiority. However, I believe he was not simply claiming everyone else is 
wrong, while he alone is right. Rather, I suspect, he was doing something more 
interesting: recommending that we avoid placing our trust in what anyone else tells us, 
including him. In other words, Heraclitus urges us not to rely on the testimony of others, 
but rather to inquire into the nature of things ourselves.31 Several considerations support 
this idea. First, Heraclitus chastises others for their gullibility and the ease with which 
they are “set aflutter” by what they hear (B87: “A fool is excited by every account 
(logos)”). Second, B101a (“eyes are more accurate witnesses than ears”), often read as 
ranking sense modalities, may instead be saying we should prefer “eye-witnessing” to 
 
31 Here, I agree with J. Lesher, “Early Interest in Knowledge,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early 
Greek Philosophy, A. A. Long (ed.) (Cambridge, 1999), 225-49: “Heraclitus shifted the focus of 
philosophical interest in knowledge, away from the conventional view of wisdom as embedded in the 
teachings of revered poets and self-proclaimed experts, away also from the superficial awareness of the 
features of the world available to us through sense perception, and toward a theoretical understanding of 
the cosmos that is available to us through reflection on its complex and hidden nature” (236). 
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hearsay.32 Third, Heraclitus claimed he engaged in self-examination, not learning from 
others (B101: “I searched [for] myself”), and apparently urged others to seek self-
knowledge too (B116). Fourth, as noted, Heraclitus urges others to listen not to him, but 
to the logos (B50). If, as I have argued, this requires attending directly to the world, he 
was effectively saying: “to comprehend the world, don’t just listen to me; rather, see for 
yourselves.” Finally, as I have urged, Heraclitus thought wisdom comes, not from 
learning new facts, but from correctly interpreting what is already before our eyes.33 One 
does not achieve this merely by listening to, and accepting, what others have to say.34 
However, although Heraclitus urged his audience to “wake up” and comprehend 
reality for themselves, he clearly thought achieving true insight is no easy matter (“nature 
(phusis) is wont to hide” (B123), “an unapparent connection (harmonia) is stronger than 
an apparent one” (B54)). What do most people miss, and why is it hard to grasp? A full 
and adequate answer to this question lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, I 
suspect his basic idea was something like this: instead of regarding the world as a 
collection of distinct, separate, and generally static things, we should recognize it is a 
single, dynamic, and interconnected whole.35 This is not a mere matter of assenting to the 
claim that “everything is interconnected.” Rather, it requires understanding that and how 
this is so, which, in turn, requires adopting a way of thinking adequate to the structure of 
reality. What does this involve? When Heraclitus claims, in B50, that “all things are one” 
(hen panta einai, B50), I suggest his idea was not that we should dismiss multiplicity and 
diversity as illusory, as some Eleatic monists were later inclined to do. Rather, it was that 
we should hold “one” and “all things” in our minds at once, without collapsing one into 
the other, since, at the highest level of generality, unity and diversity depend on each 
 
32 As argued by Kahn, Art and Thought, 106 and Robb, “Psyche and Logos,” 331-2.  
33 Arguably, B93 (“the lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives a sign”) – often 
read as a reference to Heraclitus’ own “riddling” style – actually conveys a similar point. Heraclitus may 
have intended, not to compare himself to Apollo, but rather to insist that understanding reality requires the 
hard work of interpretation, since the meaning of things does not rest on the surface. 
34 Allow me to offer two speculative thoughts to corroborate this idea. First, Heraclitus had a reputation as a 
recluse. If this reputation was deserved, he cannot have thought acquiring wisdom requires a teacher. 
Second, Heraclitus’ aphorisms seem ill-suited to convince others that his positive doctrines are superior to 
his rivals’, but are well-suited to serve as a reprimand, provocation, and spur to thought for his audience. 
35 Here, I concur with D. Furley, The Greek Cosmologists, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1987): “many of surviving 
quotations from Heraclitus’ book can be given a context and a connected meaning if we think of them as 
directed against giving too much autonomy to individual beings in the world” (33). 
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other.36 The same holds for change and rest: much as the barley drink persists only when 
stirred (B125), or a river abides only when its waters flow (B12), so the whole cosmos 
persists, not despite changing, but by changing.37 Wisdom consists in grasping and 
appreciating this interdependence of opposites, from particular instances to the cosmos as 
a whole. This, I submit, is what most people ultimately fail to do, on Heraclitus’ view. As 
a result, they lack understanding, both of the cosmos and of each of its parts. 
Let us take stock. I have argued that Heraclitus was deeply interested in human 
understanding, believed that most people fundamentally fail to comprehend the world in 
which they live, and exhorted them to strive for insight for themselves. I have also 
sketched, in very general terms, what I believe Heraclitus thought most people are 
missing, and why. But what does this have to do with ethics? As I understand him, 
Heraclitus believed we ought to strive, perhaps above all else, for the wisdom and insight 
he describes. Why ought we to do this? I suspect that Heraclitus, like many later 
philosophers, did not value wisdom for its usefulness for achieving other ends, such as 
wealth, pleasure, or honour. Rather, I submit, he had three main reasons for thinking we 
should strive for wisdom. First, he believed that becoming wise improves the soul. As 
noted, Heraclitus believed our souls can be in better or worse states, and that the state of 
our soul is a proper object of ethical concern. If, as he claims, the best soul is the wisest, 
and if we care about our souls, we should therefore care about acquiring wisdom. Second, 
Heraclitus may have believed that living in profound ignorance, oblivious to the world in 
which one lives, just is a bad thing. After all, we don’t want to be “at odds” with the 
world in which we live, or to “sleepwalk” through our lives, as all would agree.38 Here, 
Heraclitus may have thought, we hit normative bedrock: it is intrinsically bad to be 
ignorant of, and oblivious to, the fundamental nature of reality. If people are in this state, 
they just are living badly.39 Third, and finally, Heraclitus seemingly believed that by 
 
36 In B50, hen (“one”) and ta panta (“all things”) can both serve as grammatical subject. This parallel 
construction may have been deliberate. As is often noted, Heraclitus emphasizes the “opposition of unity” 
as much as the “unity of opposites.” On this point, see e.g. M. M. MacKenzie, “Heraclitus and the Art of 
Paradox,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6 (1988), 1-37, especially 9-12. 
37 Cf. B84a: “Changing, it rests.” 
38 Cf. B73: “One ought not to speak and act like people asleep.” Although Marcus Aurelius may have been 
paraphrasing, I believe the ethical sentiment is genuinely Heraclitean: Heraclitus thought it was simply 
bad for us to sleepwalk through our lives, oblivious to, and at odds with, the world in which we live. 
39 There is another possible reason for pursuing wisdom, related to this one. Heraclitus may have thought 
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becoming wise we become like god. It is to this last idea that I now turn. 
 
3. God and Wisdom 
 
Heraclitus was deeply interested in religion. The extant fragments include frequent 
references to god or gods, and numerous remarks on religious practices and themes.40 On 
the basis of these remarks, it is clear he believed in divinities, and also – as we will see – 
that he inclined towards the idea of a single, powerful, all-pervading deity. In addition, 
Heraclitus criticized certain religious rites and practices that were common in his day. On 
the basis of these remarks, some have read him as a relatively straightforward critic of 
Greek popular religion, who wished to highlight the absurdity of, for example, absolution 
through blood sacrifice, worshipping statues, or the Dionysian festivals. Others have 
regarded his stance on popular religion as more subtle: he argued not that such practices 
should be abandoned, but rather that they should be reconceived, so their true meaning is 
appreciated and understood.41 Whatever the case, Heraclitus clearly believed there was 
something wrong with the way his contemporaries worshipped and appeased the gods. In 
this way, he urged his fellow Greeks to change the way they live. However, I want to 
focus here on a different theme: not Heraclitus’ attitude toward popular Greek religion, 
but rather the connections he drew between god and wisdom. 
Heraclitus believed that gods are vastly superior to human beings:  
 
B78: Human nature has no insight, but divine nature has it. 
B79: A man is called foolish by a divinity, as a child is by a man. 
B83: The wisest of humans will appear as an ape in comparison with a god in respect to 
 
that if we are ignorant of the world, we will also be ignorant of ourselves, since we are parts of the world. 
The badness of this ignorance could be cashed out in the terms I use here, if it is intrinsically bad to lack 
self-knowledge. But it could also be developed in a different way; for Heraclitus may have thought acting 
and speaking well requires understanding oneself and one’s world, since only then can one become 
congruent with nature. On this view, wisdom has instrumental value, since it leads to (or, at least, is 
necessary for) right speech and action. I am grateful to David Wolfsdorf for suggesting this possibility.  
40 The extent of Heraclitus’ interest in religion is documented and emphasized by G. Most, “Heraclitus on 
Religion,” Rhizomata 1.2 (2013), 153-67. 
41 See for example M. Adoménas, “Heraclitus on Religion,” Phronesis 44.2 (1999), 87-113. 
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wisdom (sophia), beauty, and all other things.42  
 
In emphasizing the gulf separating gods from humans, Heraclitus worked within a long 
tradition in ancient Greek thought.43 Indeed, his claim that “human nature has no insight” 
is reminiscent of Socrates’ famous conclusion, in Plato’s Apology, that “human wisdom is 
worth little or nothing” (23a6-7). Such comparisons between humans and gods aim to 
instil humility in the face of our human limitations. In a similar vein, Heraclitus likened 
human opinions to children’s playthings (B70), emphasized the insignificance of a human 
lifetime (B52), and urged us to avoid hubris (B43). Of course, Heraclitus believed some 
humans are vastly superior to the hoi polloi, and included himself in this select group.44 
However, as the example of Socrates also shows, it is possible to combine a humble 
belief in the inherent weakness of human nature with a firm sense of one’s own 
superiority to the common run of humankind. I suspect that Heraclitus, much like 
Socrates, derived his sense of superiority, above all, from his belief in the profound 
ignorance of most of humankind. The comparison should not be overdrawn. Heraclitus, 
unlike Plato’s Socrates, apparently believed he had acquired the kind of profound insight 
most people lack. In addition, unlike Socrates, he believed wisdom requires 
understanding the world. Nevertheless, the ignorance of human beings and the cosmic 
insignificance of their lives were clearly important themes in Heraclitus’ thought.  
Heraclitus also connected divinity with wisdom. In all three fragments quoted 
above, the gods’ superiority to humans is intellectual, above all. His praise of the gods’ 
superior insight and wisdom suggests he regarded divine wisdom as a kind of ideal, to 
which humans can aspire (I revisit this idea below). In addition, Heraclitus sometimes 
refers to god as “the wise” (to sophon):  
 
 
42 The authenticity of this fragment from the Hippias Major is questioned by, for example, Marcovich, 
Heraclitus, 488. It is cautiously defended by Kahn, Art and Thought, 174 (with n.211).  
43 See Snell, Discovery, 136-52. 
44 Heraclitus sometimes singles out particular contemporaries as vastly superior to the common herd, as in 
B121 (Hermodorus) and B39 (Bias of Priene). He also says “one person is ten thousand to me if he is 
best” (B49). Incidentally, while these remarks – and his general disdain for the masses – suggest 
Heraclitus was not sympathetic to democracy, I find no evidence in the fragments that he took an active 
interest in the central questions of political philosophy, as opposed to those of ethics.  
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B32: The wise is one (hen to sophon): it alone is both willing and unwilling to be called 
by the name of Zeus.45 
B41: The wise is one (hen to sophon): knowing (epistasthai) the intelligent plan 
(gnomên) by which all things are steered through all.  
B108: Of those whose accounts I have heard, no one reaches the point of recognizing that 
the wise (sophon) is set apart from all. 
 
These fragments shed light on both Heraclitus’ conception of god and his conception of 
wisdom. In B32, the label “to sophon” refers to god, as the reference to Zeus makes clear. 
By referring to god as “the wise,” Heraclitus indicates that he regarded wisdom as among 
god’s central attributes, if not as the central divine attribute. This wise deity is “both 
willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus (Zênos).” In agreement with most 
commentators, I understand Heraclitus’ point roughly as follows. God is willing to be 
called “Zeus,” since this name, of all the names we have, is uniquely apt to denote the 
most powerful deity and ruler of all. Yet at the same time, god is unwilling to be called by 
this name, since he is unlike the Zeus of traditional religion, presumably because he lacks 
the human attributes (and concomitant flaws) commonly associated with the king of the 
Olympians. If this is on the right track, it seems Heraclitus regarded god as powerful and 
a ruler, but not anthropomorphic.  
In B41, Heraclitus again claims “the wise is one” (hen to sophon). Commentators 
dispute whether “to sophon” in this fragment refers to god (i.e. “that which is wise”), or 
to “wisdom” in general. In fact, it may refer to both. Since the phrase (“hen to sophon”) 
refers to god in B32, it is prima facie likely Heraclitus intended it to do so here too. 
However, the remainder of the fragment reads like an account of wisdom in general. To 
be wise, Heraclitus seems to say, just is to “know” (epistasthai) the “intelligent plan” (or 
“thought,” gnômên) by which “all things are steered (ekubernêse) through all things.” On 
the basis of B64 (“thunderbolt guides all things”), we know Heraclitus conceived of god 
as “steering” or “guiding” all things (the thunderbolt is a traditional symbol for Zeus). 
For Heraclitus, then, it seems that true wisdom consists in grasping the divine “plan” for 
 
45 Reading mounon with the whole predicate phrase.  
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the cosmos. But this is something god knows most of all. If this is right, then, as often 
with Heraclitus, the ambiguity of the phrase “to sophon” may have been deliberate. True 
wisdom consists in knowing the “plan” by which all things are steered through all things; 
and this is exemplified by god, the “one” who is paradigmatically wise.46 
In B108, Heraclitus claims that “the wise” (or “wisdom,” sophon) is “different 
from all” (pantôn kechôrismenon). Interpretations of this fragment vary widely. However, 
most commentators agree that Heraclitus is again referring to god.47 If this is right, the 
question becomes how best to understand the claim that god is “different” (or “separate”) 
from all. It seems to me unlikely that Heraclitus was claiming god is a transcendent 
intelligence, as some have maintained.48 Literal physical separation is inconsistent with 
Heraclitus’ claim, in B67, that “God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, 
satiety and hunger, but changes the way <oil>, when mixed with perfumes, is named 
according to the scent of each.” The image is of oil mixing with perfumes and taking on 
their various scents.49 In an analogous way, it seems, Heraclitus envisaged god as 
pervading and underlying the phenomenal world, not as spatially distinct from it. In fact, 
though, this image suggests a better interpretation. Heraclitus’ point may have been that 
although god pervades and underlies the world we perceive, he should not be simply 
identified with it, or it with him. Rather, for Heraclitus, god is distinct from the 
phenomenal world, just as, on his view, “one” (hen) is distinct from “all things” (ta 
panta). I argued above that when Heraclitus claimed that “all things are one” (B50), he 
was not maintaining, in Eleatic fashion, that apparent multiplicity is illusory, and that all 
 
46 My interpretation of B41 agrees with that of Kahn, Art and Thought, 170-2. 
47 For a survey of the various possibilities, see Kirk, Cosmic Fragments, 398-400. For a very different 
interpretation, see Alex Long, “Wisdom in Heraclitus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33 (2007), 
1-17. Long argues that Heraclitus was referring to wisdom, which he took to be “different” from “all 
things,” since it alone is exempt from the general principle of the “unity of opposites.” 
48 See e.g. Marcovich, Heraclitus, 438-9. 
49 The received text, transmitted by Hippolytus, contains a lacuna. Following Diels, this is often filled with 
“fire” (pur). However, H. Fränkel, “Heraclitus on God and the Phenomenal World,” Transactions and 
Proceedings of the American Philological Association 69 (1938), 230-44, makes a compelling case for 
preferring “oil” (elaion). Among his many arguments, there is the simple point that “fire” makes no sense 
of the image: even if “thuômata” could mean “incense” (the term more commonly denoted perfumes), 
incense is not “mixed with” fire, not are fires named after the incense burned in them. By contrast, as 
Fränkel shows, it is well attested that the Greeks scented oils with perfumes and named oils after their 
scents. Neutral oil manifesting various scents would therefore provide an apt analogy for a single god 
manifesting himself in the variety of the phenomenal world. 
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things should be subsumed into a unity. Rather, his view was that unity and multiplicity 
are somehow interdependent (cf. B10: “ … out of all things one, and out of one all 
things”). My suggestion is that, for Heraclitus, god constitutes and supplies the “one.” By 
contrast, “all things” are the plural manifestations of god in the world. We should not 
conflate the one god with his many manifestations, any more than the oil of B67 should 
be identified with the various scents it takes on. That, I propose, is the point of the claim 
that “the wise” (who is one, hen) is different from all (pantôn). 
I have argued Heraclitus believed in a god who is omnipresent in the world, and 
who underlies its manifest diversity, while steering its changes. This god is supremely 
wise; indeed, for Heraclitus, god’s knowledge of how “all is steered through all” 
exemplifies wisdom. If this is right, can humans reasonably hope to acquire wisdom, or 
does it lie beyond our grasp? I see no need to read Heraclitus as deeply pessimistic on 
this point.50 To be sure, he emphasized the ignorance of the common run of humankind, 
and the epistemic gulf separating human from divine. However, this is perfectly 
compatible with thinking some people are considerably wiser than others, since we may 
more or less closely approximate the wisdom of god. Heraclitus clearly believed some 
humans, including him, are superior to the masses in wisdom, while still falling short of 
divinity (I see no reason to think Heraclitus considered himself a god, or a divinely 
inspired prophet).51 He also seemingly urged his audience to believe their fate is within 
their power; that, at least, I take to be the point of B119: “a person’s character (êthos) is 
his guardian spirit (daimôn).” This does not mean Heraclitus believed there are radically 
different kinds of wisdom: human and divine. Rather, his idea, as I understand it, was that 
the god’s wisdom serves as a (single) paradigm for human wisdom. We can approach the 
wisdom of god; and as we do, we become more like god.52 Since god is better than us, 
 
50 For a fuller defence of an optimistic view of Heraclitus on human wisdom, see P. Curd, “The Divine and 
the Thinkable: Towards an Account of the Intelligible Cosmos,” Rhizomata 1.2 (2013), 217-47, especially 
233-8.  
51 How special did Heraclitus think he and this select few were? I suspect he thought most people are 
capable of attaining wisdom, at least in principle, even if most fail in practice. For one thing, “thinking 
(phroneein) is common to all” (B113). In addition, the manner in which he chastises others for their 
ignorance and obliviousness suggests he thought they were capable of more.  
52 The view that for Heraclitus becoming wise is becoming like god is shared by H. Granger, “Death’s 
Other Kingdom: Heraclitus on the Life of the Foolish and the Wise,” Classical Philology 95.3 (2000), 
260-81. However, I doubt Heraclitus thought the wise live “at a higher pitch” (277), equated foolishness 
with death, or believed in no middle ground between foolishness and wisdom, as Granger maintains. 
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Heraclitus was deeply interested in ethical questions, construed broadly as questions 
about how we should live. Furthermore, these concerns were not peripheral to his 
philosophical project, but were instead central to his thought. In this paper, I have 
explored the ethical dimension of Heraclitus’ philosophy. My central idea is that 
Heraclitus valued wisdom above all, and regarded it as essential for living well. On my 
account, he believed most people live badly because they are oblivious to, and at odds 
with, the true nature of the world in which they live, and that wisdom consists in 
understanding this world. Heraclitus denounced both the masses and famous figures for 
their ignorance, gullibility, and lack of insight. I have argued that these criticisms reflect 
more than arrogance on his part (although they do reflect that). Rather, Heraclitus was 
aiming to startle his audience out of their complacency, urging them to “wake up” and 
grasp the natures of things for themselves. This does not require finding expert teachers, 
or studying remote phenomena, or withdrawing from the realm of the senses. Rather, it 
requires a reorientation towards, and reinterpretation of, a shared world already available 
to us all. The culmination of this process, if all goes well, is an understanding of the 
world as an interconnected and dynamic whole, as opposed to a mere collection of 
independent things. If we achieve this understanding, we will become congruent with 
reality, improve our souls, and approach the state of god, the one who is supremely wise.  
In advancing these views, Heraclitus anticipated several ideas that played a 
central role in later Greek ethical thought. Since these similarities are widely overlooked, 
I close by highlighting them. First, as I have emphasized, Heraclitus was the first Greek 
 
53 I have argued god’s main role in Heraclitus’ ethics is as an exemplar of wisdom. Some think god plays 
another role: he lays down “divine law,” to which humans should adhere. The main evidence cited in 
support of this view is B114, which, as commonly translated, includes the claim that “all human laws are 
nourished by one law, the divine law.” However, in fact, the text does not mention “divine law”: it says 
only “by the one divine” (hupo henos tou theiou). The passage could equally well be translated as saying 
all human laws are “sustained” (trephontai) by god (the “one divine”), who has ample power, as the 
fragment concludes by stating. For criticism of the view that Heraclitus distinguishes divine and human 
law in B114, see A. Mourelatos, “Heraclitus Fr. 114,” American Journal of Philology 86 (1965), 258–66, 
and, more recently, M. Schofield, “Heraclitus on Law (Fr. 114 DK),” Rhizomata 3.1 (2015), 47-61.  
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thinker we know of to treat the soul (psuchê) of the living human being as the centre of 
cognition and the bearer of ethical value. Furthermore, he was the first to (implicitly) 
urge us to care for the state of our soul, and the first to connect this good state closely to 
wisdom. Second, like many ancient philosophers, Heraclitus apparently regarded wisdom 
as an intrinsically valuable thing: something we should pursue, not because it helps us to 
acquire other things we want, but simply because it is good to be free from ignorance and 
to comprehend reality aright. Third, in a striking anticipation of Socrates, Heraclitus 
urged his fellow Greeks to recognize they are profoundly ignorant and yet complacent, 
oblivious to their own state of ignorance. Also like Socrates, he insisted on a vast 
epistemic gap separating human from divine. However, unlike Socrates, Heraclitus’ 
conception of wisdom required that we understand, not the nature of virtue, but rather the 
fundamental nature of our world, taken as a whole. Finally, like many later philosophers, 
notably the Stoics, Heraclitus believed in a supremely wise god who pervades, steers, and 
governs the cosmos. He also took the wisdom and insight of this god to provide an ethical 
ideal: a state we can approximate, and towards which we should strive. In this way, 
finally, Heraclitus introduced into Greek ethical thought, perhaps for the first time, the 
idea that humans should aspire to wisdom as a way of becoming like the divine.  
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